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NOTES
More and more misdemeanors are being created yearly, the bulk
of which are mala prohibita. As the greatest number of misdemeanors
qualify under misdemeanor-manslaughter, fewer manage to avoid the
more severe punishment for manslaughter in the first degree by com-
ing within manslaughter in the second degree, culpable negligence-
manslaughter. Cases of accidents and misfortunes or omissions, de-
void of criminal intent, rise to the level of misdemeanor-manslaughter
when the legislature so deems. This imposes greater sanctions on
crimes which require a lesser degree of culpability than offenses
within a lesser degree of manslaughter. Misdemeanor-manslaughter
could be established with proof of ordinary negligence, where culpable
negligence must be shown to convict for manslaughter in the second
degree.
To make the situation more harmonious with the concept of
having the punishment befit the crime, either legislative revision to
specifically enumerate the qualifying misdemeanors or judicial re-
shaping to limit the offenses to those inala in se appears necessary.
Knowledge and intent should be two important determinants in any
consideration of this kind. Perhaps Mr. Justice Van Voorhis' state-
ment in his dissent in People v. Nelson would serve as a good guide:
Death caused by a persop "engaged in committing a misdemeanor" was
designed to mean by a person consciously engaged in committing the
misdemeanor."10
PROPOSED SECTION 735 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: AN
IMPLICATION CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES
OF GRATUITOUS ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME?
A revision of Section 735 of the Internal Revenue Code in the
recently proposed "Trust and Partnership Income Tax Revision Bill
of 1960" 1 was intended to clarify the treatment of distributed part-
but the indictment tacitly recognized the validity of the misdemeanor-
manslaughter charge. The case is somewhat contradictory, however, in that
the conviction of the misdemeanor alone under the indictment for misdemeanor-
manslaughter is an example of the language used by the Court of Appeals in
describing merger in regard to felony-murder. Felonies that are "convictable
under" a charge of the homicide resulting from them have been held to merge
and not support a felony-murder indictment. People v. Hiiter, 184 N.Y. 237,
77 N.E. 6 (1906).
110 309 N.Y. 231, 241, 128 N.E.2d 391, 396 (1955) (emphasis added).
I H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed § 735]. See H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14 (1960).
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nership property as either ordinary income or capital gain. The new
bill affects both a distributee partner and any donee of a distributee
partner. Although it was not passed by the recent Congress, it will
probably become law next year.2
The present section 735 provides for ordinary income treatment
of a sale or exchange by a distributee partner of unrealized receiv-
ables or inventory items which have been held by him for less than
five years.3 The new bill dispenses with the five year limitation.
Thus, any sale or exchange of such assets by the distributee partner
would result in ordinary income regardless of how long the assets
were held.4
The present section 735, however, makes no provision for the
character of the asset in the hands of a donee of the distributee
partner. This may leave the distributee partner free to make a gift
of these assets to a person in whose hands they would be capital
assets. In order to eliminate this possibility, the proposed revision
provides ordinary income treatment of the sale or exchange of such
assets "by a person whose basis for any property received from such
distributee partner is determined in whole or in part by reference to
the basis of such property in the hands of such distributee partner." '5
This language includes a donee,6 and would seem to imply that the
distributee partner can shift the income inherent in the asset to an-
other person, subject only to the limitation that its character remain
the same.
Assuming that an item of receipt constitutes income, it then
becomes necessary to (1) decide whose income it is, (2) place it in
the correct year, and (3) correctly characterize it as ordinary income
or capital gain. These three difficult problems are often interrelated.
In some cases the Code explicitly provides the answer, in some it
merely suggests an answer, and in others it leaves the problem en-
tirely to the courts, with neither suggestion nor guidance. As will
be seen, the implication in the proposed section 735 that a distributee
partner can shift the income inherent in an asset is apparently in-
consistent with many sections of the Internal Revenue Code and the
decided cases determining to whom the income is attributable. The
significance of the entire problem of gratuitous assignments of income
is due to the fact that our tax laws apply progressive rates. The
individual with high income often finds it advantageous to rid him-
self of some of this income by assigning it to a person having less
21960 Tax Law Changes, 40 CCH STAND. FED. TAx. REP. 78 (extra ed.
Sept. 19, 1960).
8 INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954, § 735 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
4 See note 1 supra.
5 Ibid.
6 See CODE § 1015(a). Since the proposed § 735 determines the character
of the asset in the hands of one with a carryover basis, it would also apply
to contributions to a corporation or a partnership. See CODE §§ 351, 721.
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income, but so related to him that there is no real loss of income
within the family group. The lower rates for the donee would permit
a significant tax saving.
In the ordinary case, a gift of appreciated property is not a tax-
able event.7  The donor's basis for the property is retained by the
donee, and upon the occurence of some taxable event (e.g., a sale),
the donee is taxed on the full amount of income inhering in the gift,
measured by the difference between the donor's basis and the amount
realized by the donee." Income which, from the economist's point of
view, has been earned but never realized by the donor, has thus been
effectively transferred.9 In addition, the character of the asset and
the income inherent in it may have been changed by the transferral.
This follows from the fact that the "capital" nature of an asset, as
defined by the Code, is not a characteristic of the asset itself, but rather
arises from its relation to its owner (here, the vendor).1o An asset
which is held for sale in the ordinary course of trade or business is
not a capital asset. But when transferred to one who does not so
hold it, it becomes a capital asset. Thus, when a dealer in stocks
makes a bona fide gift of stock to his son, who is not a stock dealer,
the asset changes character."1
Another situation arises when the donor contracts to sell the
asset and makes a gift of his contract right. He has progressed one
step further towards realizing the income. If he is an accrual basis
taxpayer, the income is realized on sale,' 2 but if he is on a cash basis,
it is not realized until he receives money or its equivalent.13  None-
theless, the cases indicate that a contract to sell will convert the in-
come inherent in an appreciated asset into that type of property which
cannot be effectively transferred for tax purposes.14
Assignment of Income
In the case of Lucas v. Earl,'5 there was an outright assignment
of income as yet unearned. In 1901, respondent contracted with his
wife that all property either one might thereafter acquire would be re-
7 See Taft v. Powers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
8 CoDE § 1015. Other rules apply if the gift was made before January 1,
1921. Ibid.
9 See Bishop v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1952).
1o See COna §§ 1221, 1231.
"1 See Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
'12 Helvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
13 Willhoit v. Commissioner, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 1024 (1958).
14 See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); United
States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (dictum). Compare
Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1949) (dictum), with
Wodehouse v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1949). See Rohmer v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1467 (1950).
25281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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ceived and held in joint tenancy. Despite the contract, the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, taxed the respondent on all
of the income earned by his own efforts, refusing to attribute the
fruits "to a different tree from that on which they grew." 16 The
same result was reached in Helvering v. Eubank,17 where the at-
tempted assignment concerned fees of an insurance agent already
earned, but as yet uncollected. The Court did not make clear the
precise grounds for imposing the tax on the donor, but based their
decision solely on Helvering v. Horst.'8 Thus, the Court has com-
mitted itself to the general proposition that income will be taxed to
the one who earns it. As previously noted, the proposed section 735
may lead to contrary results.
Gift of Property Representing Income
The Horst case involved a gift of negotiable interest coupons
detached from a bearer bond and transferred by respondent before
their maturity. Respondent retained ownership of the bond. The
Commissioner ruled that the interest payments were taxable to the
donor.19 The Court, in supporting the Commissioner, placed much
emphasis on the fact that the donor, when making the gift, enjoyed
the same satisfaction he would have enjoyed spending the interest on
goods for himself.20 If this theory of satisfaction were really the
basis of the decision, it should follow that the income was realized
when the gift was made, and not, as the Commissioner had ruled,
when the interest payments were received.21 However, the "satis-
faction theory" appealed, at least for a time, to the Internal Revenue
Service.2 2 The theory, however, is open to criticism. All gifts cause
a certain satisfaction to the donor and the donee. If then, the test
is whether or not the donor has enjoyed income by the mere act of
donation, all cases should be decided in the same way.
23
While the person who gives away the coupon is giving away
property just the same as the person who gives away the whole bond,
it would seem that, for purposes of the tax laws, two different kinds
of property are involved. Reference may be had to Mr. Holmes'
16Id. at 115.
17 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
1s311 U.S. 112 (1940).
19Id. at 114.
20 Id. at 116-18.
21 Miller, Gifts of Income and of Property: What the Horst Case Decides,
5 TAX L. REV. 1, 5-10 (1949).
22 See I.T. 3910, 1948-1 Ctm. BULL. 15; I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 7.
Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 223, and Rev. Rul. 55-531, 1955-2 Cum.
BULL. 520, revoked these Income Tax Rulings.
23 See Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Taxes.
64 YALE L.J. 991, 993-95 (1955).
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"fruit trees." 24 As a starting point, it may be said that one cannot give
away the fruit and retain the tree. This analogy is offered as a state-
ment of the problem rather than a solution, for it makes the point
that not all property will be treated in the same manner. The ques-
tion is what kind of property is only "fruit"? The apparent implica-
tion in the proposed section 735 obviates the necessity of distinguishing
between "fruit" and "tree" when the gift is made by the distributee
partner.
Patents and Copyrights
The creation of an inventor or an author is the result of per-
sonal efforts, and at least to this extent, is similar to the fees earned
by an insurance agent. Nonetheless, the property he has created
seems likely to be treated, in his hands, as property which can be
effectively transferred.25
Where a transfer is made, it is important for the author or in-
ventor to completely relinquish control over the transferred asset. As
in other facets of the problem, the retention of a certain degree of con-
trol is one factor which will compel the courts to overlook the gift
and tax the donor.26  In Commissioner v. Sunnen, 7 the Supreme
Court found that the assignments of license contracts there involved
were a transfer of a right to receive income rather than a complete
disposition of all the donor's interest. The taxpayer had given non-
exclusive licenses on a patent owned by him to a corporation which
he controlled. The licenses could be cancelled by either party on
written notice. The corporation agreed to pay a royalty based on
gross sales. The taxpayer assigned all his rights in the contract to
his wife. In holding him taxable on the royalties, the Court relied
on his power to cancel the contract, control the corporation's pro-
duction, and grant licenses to other persons.28  The Court also con-
sidered his economic condition, which was in reality unchanged.2 9
A further consideration is that there must be a patent or copy-
right to give away. In Strauss v. Commissioner,3 0 the taxpayer
assigned to his wife all his "right, title and interest in Koda-
chrome ... " 31 His right, title and interest had been acquired by
24 "This metaphor has been substituted for rational analysis by courts and
commentators to the point where a critic in this area frequently cannot see the
forest for the fruit trees." Id. at 991.
25 Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956). See Lockhart v.
Commissioner, 258 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 54-599, 1954-2 Cums.
BULL. 52; Rev. Rul. 54-409, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 174.
26 See Washington v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1936) (dictum),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 689 (1936).
27 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
28 Id. at 608-10.
2 9 
rd. at 609-10.
30 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948).
31 Id at 442.
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performance of personal services and financing. He did not receive
any part of the process itself, nor any control over it, but merely
"the enforceable promise of the owners of the process that he would
be paid for his services .... ,, 32 The court stated that the tax-
payer's rights were indistinguishable from those in the Eubank case,
and that the real issue was "who earned the income." s The tax-
payer was defeated because all he ever had was a mere chose in
action. The chose in action ultimately represented personal services
rendered for another. It was, in effect, a wage and, unlike other
kinds of property interests, was not capable of being transferred.
If, on the other hand, the donor's invention is transferred to a manu-
facturer in return for a royalty, the courts will recognize a subse-
quent assignment of the royalty by the inventor as an effective shift
of the inherent income.3 4 The distinction seems to lie in the nature
of the interest held by the donor. In the Strauss situation, the in-
terest constituted wages, and this was not capable of being trans-
formed into another kind of interest.
It is interesting to note that the Code excludes from capital
gains treatment copyrights and literary, musical or artistic composi-
tions in the hands of the one who creates them and in the hands of
one who has a carryover basis. This is substantially the same lan-
guage as is used in the proposed section 735 and leads to the same
implication, namely, that income will be taxed to the donee. This
conclusion is consonant with the cases in the area.
3 6
Mineral Rights
Income from an oil well in the form of a royalty is ordinary
income.3 7  No little effort has been exerted by taxpayers to convert
it into capital gain and to shunt it over to a low-bracket relative.
A great number of interests in minerals in the ground has been
developed.38  In the area of gratuitous assignments, as well as capi-
tal gains, the fundamental problem is to distinguish between transfers
of property and transfers of a mere right to income. In this area,
the rules for capital gains and gratuitous assignments overlap to such
32 Ibid.
33 Id. at 443.
34 Commissioner v. Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Nelson v. Ferguson,
56 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565 (1932) ; Fox v. Commissioner,
37 B.T.A. 271 (1938); Lilienfeld v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 391 (1937).
See Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959).
35 CODE § 1221(3).
36 See cases cited note 25 supra.
37 See Anderson v. Hielvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel,
287 U.S. 103 (1932).
38 See Ray & Hammonds, Federal Income Tax on Assignments of Interests
in Oil and Gas, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAX PROCEDURES 1299 (1956).
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a degree that, at least in broad outline, the decisions in one type of
case are authority in the other.39
In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,40 the Supreme Court held
that transfers of oil payments 41 carved out of larger interests were
not capital transactions. The Court proceeded on the assumption
that, according to state law, economic interests in minerals in the
ground had been transferred, 42 but concluded that the consideration
was essentially a substitute for what would otherwise have been re-
ceived, in time, as ordinary income. In doing so, the Court relied
on the fact that if such interests were transferred as gifts, the income
would be taxable to the donor.43  Another point mentioned in the
Court's opinion was that none of the assignments was so substantial
that the assignee assumed a significant proportion of the assignor's
risk.44 The Court did not expressly hold that all oil payments carved
out of interests of a greater duration would result in ordinary income,
but on the other band it did not limit its language. 4' The result,
considering that one interest was of ten years duration, would seem
to be that the rule is absolute that the sale of carved-out oil payments
results in ordinary income.46
The doctrine of the Lake case had been previously developed by
the Commissioner in a series of rulings, despite significant opposition
in the lower courts. 47  In 1946, the Commissioner, in the area of
capital gains, distinguished between long and short-lived interests.48
In 1949, the same distinction was applied to the question of who was
to be taxed after a gratuitous assignment,49 and in 1950 the distinc-
tion was abandoned altogether, the Commissioner ruling that for both
purposes:
... the assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged for development),
vhich extends over a period less than the life of the depletable property in-
3 Compare Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), with
Flewellen v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 317 (1959). See The Supreme Court,
1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 112-15 (1958).
40356 U.S. 260 (1958).
41 The Court described an oil payment as "the right to a specified sum of
money, payable out of a specified percentage of the oil, or the proceeds received
from the sale of such oil, if, as and when produced." rd. at 261, n.1, quoting
Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410 (1940).
42 Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 264 (1958).
43 Id. at 267.
44 Id. at 265.
45 See Benjamin & Currier, The Supreme Court and Taxation of Oil, Gas
and Production Payments: The Lake Cases, 19 LA. L. REv. 579, 596 (1958).
46 Id. at 591.
47 See Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Hawn v. Com-
missioner, 23 T.C. 516 (1954), rev'd, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Nordan
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954).
48 G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CumI. Bu. 66.
49 I.T. 3935, 1949-1 Cuam. BULL. 39.
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terest from which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income
from such property interest. 50
The Tax Court has recently applied the principle of the Lake
case in Flewellen v. Commissioner 51 without discussion of the dura-
tion of the interest involved. From all appearances it would seem
that the Commissioner has won the day. Here, as in other areas,
the courts have applied the principle that income will be taxed to the
one who earns it, either through his personal efforts or his capital.
Disposal of Installment Obligations
The Code expressly recognizes the problems involved in the
donation of income in its treatment of installment obligations. A
special accounting method is provided for income in certain sales in
which payment is to be received over a period of time. The general
legislative plan is to consider each payment as representing a certain
amount of cost and income, rather than to tax the income as one
lump sum. 52 Thus, an installment obligation disposed of before ma-
turity is composed of elements of unrealized income and cost. Section
453 (d) of the Code provides that if an installment obligation is given
away, the donor will be taxed on the difference between the basis
of the obligation and its fair market value at the time of the gift.
The basis of the obligation is "the excess of the face value of the
obligation over an amount equal to the income which would be re-
turnable were the obligation satisfied in full." 53 In effect, the prin-
ciple that is applied by the Code is one of immediate realization. No
matter how the obligation is disposed of, except at death,54 a taxable
event has taken place, and the unrealized income earned by the sale
is immediately realized. When a gift of such an obligation is made,
income is in effect considered to have been earned by the original
sale, and merely to have been deferred for so long as the original
owner held the obligation. On the other hand, if the obligation
passes at death, the income inherent in it is considered as income in
respect of a decedent, and is reported by the one who receives it, in
the same manner as would have been done by the decedent.55
The treatment of installment obligations raises the issue of how
comparable receivables will be handled if the taxpayer does not elect
to report them on the installment method. The accrual basis taxpayer
generally raises no problems because in most cases he will have real-
50 I.T. 4003, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 10, 11.
5132 T.C. 317 (1959).
52 CODE § 453.
3 CODE § 453(d). For an example, see Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9 (1958).
54 CODE § 453(d)3.
-55 CODE § 691(a)4.
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ized income at the time of the sale,5 6 and therefore, he cannot rid
himself of this income by a subsequent gift of the receivables. As
to the cash basis taxpayer, the situation seems somewhat less clear.
A cash basis taxpayer has no income until he actually receives cash,
or its equivalent, in excess of the adjusted basis of the property
sold." In such a case, the cash basis taxpayer's situation after a
gift of the receivable is comparable to that of a taxpayer who has
elected to use the installment method, in that income inherent in the
receivables has been assigned. However, if the taxpayer is not using
the installment method, there is no specific section of the Code at-
tributing the inherent income in the receivable to the donor. The
Commissioner has ruled that accounts receivable, representing com-
pensation for personal services, which have been assigned to an
irrevocable trust, are taxable to the assignor upon collection.5 8
Apparently there is no ruling or reported decision directly in point
as to receivables derived from sales of property. The Tax Court has
held that when an individual operating a service business incorporates
that business, and, as a part of the assets transferred, transfers re-
ceivables, the corporation, and not the individual, becomes the taxable
person. 59 On the other hand, courts have taxed a corporation on
the income from receivables which had been distributed to share-
holders after dissolution. 0
A leading case in this area is Doyle v. Commissioner.61 There,
the taxpayer had assigned part of his interest in a judgment against
the United States to his wife and children. The assignment occurred
before payment but after denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
The court imposed the tax on the assignor, holding that this was an
anticipatory assignment of income and not merely a transfer of
property. It is notable, however, that the court considered other
factors, including the taxpayer's control over the funds of his wife
and children, the amount of income earned in the transaction, as well
as the timing of the assignments. 62
By analogy, it may be noted that unrealized accounts receivable
constitute items of income in respect of a decedent, whether the obli-
gation was treated on the installment method, or otherwise.6 3
561-elvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1934).
57 Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
58 Rev. Rul. 55-2, 1955-1 Cum. Bum.. 211.
59 Briggs v. Commissioner, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440 (1956). See also
Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
60 Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Carter v. Commissioner,
9 T.C. 364 (1947), af'd, 170 F.2d 911 (1948). Cf. J. Ungar, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957).
61 147 F2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945).6 2 Id. at 772-73.6 3 Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd per
curiams, 192 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1951).
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The trend of the cases is to tax the one who earned the income,
and as a rule this will be the donor of the receivable. 64  There is
presently no provision as to donees of receivables analogous to the
treatment of donees of distributee partners in the proposed partner-
ship act. 65 It is a fair conclusion that the treatment of unrealized
receivables should not vary between partnership and sole proprietor-
ship, and that the income inherent in them should be attributed to the
one who earned it.
Income in Respect of a Decedent
A situation in which problems arise similar to those in the area
of gratuitous assignments is that of the disposition of property of
a decedent. The general rule is that property acquired from a de-
cedent is given a basis equal to its fair market value at the time of
death, or one year after death if the executor so elects. 66  In the
ordinary case, if the property has appreciated during the decedent's
lifetime, no income tax will be incurred on that appreciation.67  Of
course, the assets will be subject to an estate tax based on their fair
market value, but in many cases there will be no tax,68 or less tax
than an income tax on the same amount.6 9 This treatment may be
justified in the case of the asset which would not essentially repre-
sent income, because death is an involuntary transfer. However,
such treatment was extended by the courts to all items.70 In such a
situation, the estate of the cash basis decedent was in a superior posi-
tion to that of one on the accrual basis. The courts had held that
income earned but not realized by the decedent who followed a cash
basis was not income to the estate, and hence might well escape in-
come taxation. On the other hand, the accrual basis taxpayer would
have already realized such income, and it was reportable on his final
return.7 ' To avoid the inequity of such a situation, Congress pro-
vided, in the Revenue Act of 1934, that amounts accrued up to the
time of the death of a taxpayer should be included in computing his
net income for the taxable year of his death. 72  The difficulty with
that solution was that it often caused an undue bunching of income
in the final year.73  In 1942, Congress enacted a section which has
64 See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
65 But see CoDE § 1221(3), dealing with donees of copyrights.
66 CODE § 1014.
67 Burnett v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 897 (1943).
68 See CODE, § 2052, providing a $60,000 exemption.
69 See Covz § 2001.
70 Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 241 (1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
584 (1928).
71 Ibid.
72 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 42, 48 Stat. 694 (1934).
73 See Commissioner v. Linde, 213 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1954).
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been carried over into the present law.74 Section 691 of the present
Code regards all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which
are not properly included in the decedent's own return, as the income
of the one entitled to receive it.
7 5
Despite the historical background and the language of the cases,
this section has been broadly construed to cover more than income
which would have been accrued by the deceased at the time of his
death. It has been held that where a company had a bonus plan in
which a decedent had participated for a number of years, a bonus
paid after decedent's death is income in respect of a decedent even
though he had no legally enforceable right to the bonus at the time
of his death.7 6 Where decedent had turned over his crop of grapes
to a "wine pool" for sale, all of the resultant income was income in
respect of a decedent, even though the sales from which the income
was derived were made after the death of the decedent.7 7  Accounts
receivable, representing consummated sales, result in income in re-
spect of a decedent when sold or collected.7 8 On the other hand, the
section has not been extended to cover livestock or crops, whether
harvested or not.7
9
The Code explicitly provides a treatment for the disposal of
the right to a decedent's income. When such a right is transferred
to a person other than the one who receives it by reason of the death
of the decedent, the estate or person making the transfer is taxed on
the disposition. 0  "Disposition" includes a gift. 1  This provision is
exactly analogous to section 453(d), which provides that the dis-
position of installment obligations causes immediate recognition of
income to the donor. Both of these areas where the Code expressly
provides for selection of the taxable person are in apparent conflict
with the implications of the proposed section 735.
Conclusion
Certain concepts have intruded into the area of gratuitous assign-
ments without shedding much light. Merely to state that a transfer
of property will be recognized for tax purposes, but that when un-
earned income is transferred it will not, begs the question; for every-
thing that is transferred in any of the cases is property. It is a
certain type of property that must be considered as different, as rep-
74 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 126, as amended, 56 Stat. 831 (1942).
75 CoDE § 691(a) 1.
76 O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).
77 Commissioner v. Linde, mtpra note 73.
78 Dixon v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd per
curian, 192 Ft2d 82 (6th Cir. 1951).
79 Rev. Rul. 58-436, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 366.
80 CoDE § 691(a)2.
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.691 (a) (4) (1957).
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resenting income, and not capable of being effectively transferred for
tax purposes. To rely on satisfaction in making a gift leads to no
better results, for it applies to all cases in which any gift is made.
It is certainly valid to say that a transfer must be complete, so
that control over what is transferred is given up, and that no sub-
stantial interest is retained in what was given away.8 2  After a true
transfer has been found, the courts will then try, within the confines
of the statute, to attribute income to the one who earned it by his
efforts or his capital. In certain cases, the Code does not allow such
an application of the taxing power, because it provides aberrational
treatment for assets transferred by death or gift. This is not to
criticize the treatment provided, for it is practical. It is merely to
say that it is aberrational, and will interfere with the symmetry of
the system within which it is included.
The trend of the courts in the areas of assignment of income,
mineral rights, installment obligations, and income in respect of a
decedent, has been to attribute and tax the income to the one who
earned it. The implication in the proposed section 735 that a dis-
tributee partner can effectively transfer receivables to a donee, is
inconsistent with this trend. The treatment of unrealized receivables
should not vary-the income inherent in them should be attributed
to the one who earned it.
82 These are the basic issues in dispute in the family partnership and trust
cases. Family partnerships may be valid, and where capital is a material
income-producing factor they are expressly recognized by § 704(e) of the Code,
but it is clear that the transaction on which such a partnership rests must
be bona fide, vesting dominion and control of the interest transferred in the
donee. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (1956); Finlen v. Healy, CCH 1960
STAND. FED. TAx RE. (60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9688 (D. Mont. Aug. 23, 1960)
(memorandum decision).
A transfer of property to a trust will relieve the donor of subsequent
income from it, if such a transfer would be effective if made to a natural
person, and if the requirements of the Code as to duration and dominion and
control are complied with. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937)
CoDE §§ 671-78; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.671-678 (1956).
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